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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-

3(2)0);
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellee does not object to Appellant's statement of issues. Appellee does object to
Appellant's statement of the applicable standards of review for issue one (denial of
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment) and issue three (failure to give certain
requested Jury instructions.) The proper standard of review for those issues is included in
the discussion of each of those issues below.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involved a quiet title action by Elaine Jenkins against Alan Jenkins, D.U.
Company and the Davis County Cooperative Society. D.U. Company was dismissed from
the action on its own motion, since D.U. Company claimed no interest in the property. At
trial, the Davis County Cooperative Society disclaimed any interest in the property. As
between Elaine Jenkins and Alan Jenkins, the owner of record of the property, a Jury found
in favor of Elaine Jenkins. Based on the Jury's verdict the property was quieted in the name
of Elaine Jenkins and Sam Jenkins (Elaine Jenkins' deceased husband), as against any
interest by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis County Cooperative Society.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1«

Elaine Jenkins was raised in an economic system under which all "income"

and "property" of the members were held "in common" (the "Order.") R.384, p.45.

2.

As a teenager and during her early 20s, Elaine Jenkins worked for at least eight

businesses owned by or affiliated with the Order. R.384, 1 p. 37-43.
3.

Elaine Jenkins did not receive a paycheck for work performed at any of those

businesses, but instead received each month a number of "units" credited to her "account"
with the Davis County Cooperative Society, an entity that was part of the Order. 2 R. 384,
p. 39.
4.

"Units" were equivalent to "cash." R. 384, p. 52

5.

Having "units" on deposit in your account was like having cash in a "savings

account," that was available to "spend on something." R. 384, p. 2.
6.

One way Elaine Jenkins (and other members of the Order) could spend those

"units" by going to "another business that was owned by the [Order], buy[ing] whatever
goods they had there, or services, and it was debited off of [her] statement." R. 384, p. 39.
7.

Each month Elaine Jenkins would receive a "statement" from the Davis

County Cooperative Society that showed the number "units" that she had earned for that

Elaine Jenkins worked for Velanz Manufacturing Company (as a seamstress), Imperial
Market (as a clerk and cashier), Shoppers Discount (as a clerk), Co-op Department Store (as
manager of the shoe department), a potato farm in Idaho (moving pipes and weeding), orchards
(picking fruit), East Gate Publishing Company and East Side Market. R. 384, p. 37-43.
2

The number of units "credited" to Elaine Jenkins' account each month was based on the
number of hours worked. R. 384, p. 39. When a member of the Order worked for a business that
was not affiliated with the Order, the money earned from that business was turned over to the
Davis County Cooperative Society and credited to the member's account. R. 384, p. 44. For
example, when Elaine Jenkins worked for The Burnham Gun Club, a business not affiliated with
the Order, all of the money that she earned was given to the Davis County Cooperative Society,
and then "credited to [Elaine Jenkins] on [her] statement." R. 384, p. 44.
2

month and the number of "units" spent.3 R. 384, p. 39.
8.

Sam Jenkins was also a member of the Order. R. 382, p. 42.

9.

In 1975, Sam and Elaine Jenkins were married. R. 384, p. 50.

10.

After their marriage, Sam and Elaine Jenkins continued to receive monthly

statements from the Davis County Cooperative Society that showed the number of "units"
credited to and the number of "units" debited from their account each month. R. 384, p. 49.
11.

At trial, Elaine Jenkins introduced copies of thirty-three (33) monthly

statements that she and Sam Jenkins had received from the Davis County Cooperative
Society, between September 1979 and July 1996. R. 384, p. 49. See Plaintiffs Exhibit I.
12.

After their marriage, Sam and Elaine Jenkins decided to purchase a home in

Woods Cross, Utah (the "Woods Cross House"). R. 384, p. 52.
13.

The purchase price was $40,000. R. 384, p. 52.

14<

When Sam and Elaine Jenkins bought the Woods Cross House, they paid for

3

Each statement included a list of "service slip deposits" and "service slip expenses" for
the month. A "service slip deposit" reflected a specific transaction pursuant to which a certain
number of units were credited to the account, such as "units" for work performed at a business
affiliated with the Order. A "service slip expense" reflected a specific transaction pursuant to
which a number of units were debited from the account. Each statement also listed the number
of "units used" and "units owned." "Units used" reflected the number of "units" converted to
physical assets that belonged to the member, such as furniture, a vehicle or a house. "Units
owned" was the number of "units used" plus the number of "units" on deposit in the account. If
the number of "units owned" was greater than the number of "units used," then the member had a
positive balance, and the account accrued interest. If the number of "units owned" was less than
the number of "units used" then the member had a negative balance and the member paid
interest. R. 384, p. 47-52.
3

it with 40,000 "units" from their account.4 R. 384, p. 45.
15.

The closest statement Elaine Jenkins had prior to the purchase of the Woods

Cross House was for September, 1979, which showed that the Jenkins had a credit of
24,776.10 units. R. 384, p. 51-52.
16.

The closest statement Elaine Jenkins had after the purchase of the Woods

Cross House was for November 1981, which showed the Jenkins had a debt of 7,969.16
units. R. 384, p. 53.
17.

The difference between those two statements was accounted for by, among

other things, the 40,000 units debited from the Jenkins5 account to purchase the Woods
Cross House. R. 384, p. 53.
18.

When members of the Order purchased a home, they were "expected to turn

the title [to home] over to [the Order] and allow [the Order] to put title in the name of one
of their entities." R. 384, p. 37.
19.

The Woods Cross House was titled in the name of "Worldwide," one of the

companies owned and operated by the Order. R. 384, p. 53-54.
20.

Each year, the Davis County Cooperative Society gave each member of the

Order an "inventory" that listed all property owned by the member. R. 384, p. 55.
21.

The annual inventories for Sam and Elaine Jenkins for 1984 and 1985 each

4

The Woods Cross House was not owned by someone outside the Order. Therefore, the
payment of the purchase price for the Woods Cross Home consisted of the transfer of the 40,000
"units" from one account within the Davis County Cooperative Society (i.e., the Jenkins'
account) to another account within the Davis County Cooperative Society.
4

listed a "House" valued at $40,000 as "Sam and Elaine Jenkins' Property." R. 384, p. 56-57.
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, and Addendum A hereto.
22.

After they purchased the Woods Cross House, the property taxes for the

Woods Cross House were debited from the Jenkins' account each year for payment of the
property taxes on the Woods Cross House. R. 384, p. 65. See, e.g.. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3
($844.31 charged to the Jenkins' account in 1987 for "prop taxes 85 thru May 87.")
23.

Sam and Elaine Jenkins subsequently "decided that [they] needed a bigger

house." R. 384, p. 57.
24.

The Jenkins asked Ortel Kingston, the leader of the Davis County Cooperative

Society, if they could "trade the equity from the Woods Cross House [toward] another
house; and he said [they] could." R. 384, p. 57.
25.

The Jenkins located a house at 1074 North Redwood Road (the "Redwood

Road House"), and negotiated the purchase of that house for $50,000. R. 384, p. 57-59.
26.

The purchase price was paid by Sam and Elaine Jenkins, with $40,000 coming

from their equity in the Woods Cross House and 10,000 "units" deducted from the Jenkins'
account with the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 384, p. 61.
27.

When the Redwood Road House was purchased, it was titled in the name of

"D.U. Company," a holding company owned and operated by the Order. R. 384, p. 60. See
Warranty Deed from D. Gordon Berg to D.U. Company, Inc., dated November 31, 1986,
Defendant's Exhibit 12.

5

28.

Although the Redwood Road House was title in D.U. Company, Sam and

Elaine Jenkins considered themselves to be the owners of the Redwood Road House and
"were recognized as the actual owners" of the Redwood Road House by the members of the
Order. R. 384, p. 54.
29.

Because Sam and Elaine Jenkins "paid for the house," it "actually belonged

to them." R. 384, p. 55.
30.

The annual inventories that Elaine Jenkins introduced at trial for 1987, 1990,

1994 and 1995, each listed the "House Redwood Road" valued at $50,000 as Sam and
Elaine Jenkins' "Property." See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, attached hereto as Addendum A.5 R.
384, p. 66-67.
31.

The property taxes for the Redwood Road House were debited each year from

the Jenkins 5 account with the Davis County Cooperative Society. See, e.g.. Plaintiffs
Exhibit 6, which includes charge slip 7870, dated December 1, 1990, charging the Jenkins
$1,019.17 for "property taxes," and charge slip 9100, dated December 31, 1997, charging
the Jenkins $701.01 for "property taxes 1074 N Redwood." R. 384, p. 86.
32.

For a period of time the Jenkins moved to Idaho. R. 384, p. 67-68.

33.

During that period of time, the Jenkins rented the Redwood Road House to

5

The 1987 annual inventory listed both the Wood Cross House and the Redwood Road
House as property belonging to the Jenkins. After purchasing the Redwood Road House, the
Jenkins moved from the Woods Cross House to the Redwood Road House. However, the
Jenkins "carried" both homes for a period of time before the Davis County Cooperative Society
transferred the Woods Cross House off the Jenkins' inventory list. R. 384, p. 63-64.
6

Karen Bjorkman. R. 384, p. 68.
34.

Although Karen Bjorkman's rent was paid each month by "Salt Lake County

Housing Authority" to D.U. Company, the full amount of the rent was credited back to the
Jenkins on their monthly statements with the Davis County Cooperative Society since D.U.
Company held title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins.6 R. 384, p.
69-70.
35.

In 1996, Elaine Jenkins announced that she was leaving the Order.

36.

In 1996, Elaine Jenkins also commenced a divorce action against Sam Jenkins,

captioned Elaine Jenkins vs. Samuel Walton Jenkins, Civil No. 964905253 (Utah 3rd Dist.
Ct).
37.

On May 27, 1997, Elaine Jenkins signed a stipulation in that divorce

proceeding that stated:
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho...
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the
course of the marriage.
See Defendant's Exhibit 9.
38.

Prior to signing the stipulation, Elaine Jenkins asked her lawyer if signing the

stipulation would affect her right to claim ownership of the Redwood Road House in the
future, should the need arise. R. 384, p. 71.

6

The Salt Lake County Housing Authority would only pay rent to the record title holder of
the Redwood Road House.
7

39.

Based on that discussion, Elaine Jenkins understood that after signing the

stipulation she would "still ha[ve] a right to pursue [a] claim" to the Redwood Road House
in the future, if necessary. R. 384, p. 71-72.
40.

If Elaine Jenkins had understood otherwise, she would not have signed the

stipulation. R. 384, p. 72.
41.

On August 6,1997, based on that signed stipulation, a Decree of Divorce was

entered in the divorce action that provided:
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired
certain real property in Rupert, Idaho...
12. The parties acquired no other real property during the
course of the marriage.
See Defendant's Exhibit 44.
42.

On August 24, 1997, Sam Jenkins died.

43.

After Sam's death, Elaine went to Paul Kingston, then the president of the

Davis County Cooperative Society, and demanded that title to the Redwood Road House be
deeded to her. R. 384, p. 72-73.
44.

During that conversation, Paul Kingston acknowledged that Elaine Jenkins

owned the Redwood Road House, but refused to deed the Redwood Road House to Elaine
Jenkins. 7 R. 384, p. 72-73.
45.

Between May 15,1997 and June 20,1997, D.U. Company sent Elaine Jenkins

7

Instead of deeding the Redwood Road House to Elaine Jenkins, Paul Kingston wanted to
buy the Redwood Road House back from Elaine for less than fair market value. This was
unacceptable to Elaine Jenkins. R. 384, p. 73.
8

three letters, requesting that Elaine Jenkins sign a rental agreement, and threatening to evict
her if she didn't do so. See Defendant's Exhibits 37, 39, and 40L R. 384, p. 79-80.
46.

Elaine Jenkins refused to do so, since she was the owner of the Redwood Road

House. R. 384, pp. 73,78-79.
47.

Elaine Jenkins did not thereafter pay rent on the Redwood Road House (nor

has she or Sam Jenkins ever paid rent on the Redwood Road House.) R. 384, p. 73.
48.

Elaine Jenkins continued to live in the Redwood Road House and treat the

Redwood Road House as her own. R. 384, p. 73-75.
49.

The Jenkins maintained and repaired the Redwood Road House at their own

expense - "Any time any thing broke we fixed it. Any repairs that were made were made by
us." R. 384, p. 73-74.
50.

The Jenkins painted, re-carpeted, fixed the furnace, installed new linoleum,

replaced the vanities, installed a sprinkler system and made other improvements to the
Redwood Road House. R. 384, p. 74-75.
51.

Until 2005, D.U. Company did not interfere with Elaine Jenkins's occupancy

of the Redwood Road House. 8 R. 384, p. 73-79.
52.

On February 8,2005, D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan

Jenkins, Sam Jenkins' brother, who was a member of the Order. R. 384, p. 79.

8

At the time Sam Jenkins died in 1997, the Jenkins had (or should have had) at least
6,000 "units" on deposit with the Davis County Cooperative Society, to be used to pay property
taxes on the Redwood Road House. R. 384, p. 82.
9

53.

That sale was without the consent or knowledge of Elaine Jenkins. R. 384,

54.

On February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a quiet title action against Alan

p. 79.

Jenkins.
5 5.

Elaine Jenkins testified at trial, as well as four of her children (Stanley Jenkins,

Samuel Jenkins, Rebecca Jenkins and Jesse Jenkins) and five former members of the Order
(Merlin Kingston, Lynette Taylor, Rowenna Erickson, Connie Rugg and Dewey Peterson.)
R. 384-386.
56.

The Jury found that, in 1986, D.U. Company had acquired title to the

Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins:
Q. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the property at 1074 Redwood Road was purchased on
November 21, 1986 that Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U.
Company intended that D.U. Company hold legal title to that
property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins?
Yes

X

No
See Special Verdict. R. 316-317.
57.

The Jury also found that at the time Alan Jenkins "purchased" the Redwood

Road House from D.U. Company in 2005 he had notice that D.U. Company held title to the
Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins:
Q. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at
the time Alan Jenkins purchased the property at 1074 Redwood
10

Road from D.U. Company in February, 2005, that Alan Jenkins
had either actual or constrictive notice that D.U. Company held
legal title to that property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine
Jenkins?
Yes

^

No
See Special Verdict R. 316-317.
58,

On December 27, 2006, based on the Jury's findings, the trial court entered

a Judgment quieting title to the Redwood Road House in the name of Sam Jenkins and
Elaine Jenkins "free and clear of any liens or claims affecting title to the [Redwood Road
House]"by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 368370.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Jury found that, at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in 1986,
"Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company intended that D.U. Company hold legal title
to [the Redwood Road House] for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins." The Jenkins paid
the $50,000 purchase price for the Redwood Road House with 10,000 "units" on deposit in
the Jenkins' account with the Davis County Cooperative Society and with $40,000 in equity
from the Woods Cross House. The annual inventories maintained by Davis County
Cooperative Society listed the Redwood Road House as property owned by Sam and Elaine
Jenkins. Elaine Jenkins testified that she and Sam were the actual owners of the Redwood
Road House.
11

In 2005, after D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins,
Elaine Jenkins filed a quiet title action. The Jury found that Alan Jenkins, who was also a
member of the Order, had notice of the Jenkins' ownership of the Redwood Road House.
Based on the Jury's findings, the Court quieted title to the Redwood Road House in Sam and
Elaine Jenkins name, as against any interest by Alan Jenkins, D.U. Company or the Davis
County Cooperative Society.
Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly denied. That issue is not
appealable since the matter went to trial. The statute of frauds is inapplicable since the
agreement to transfer the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of the
Jenkins was fully performed in 1986. The fact that the Jenkins' interest in the Redwood
Road House was not listed in the Divorce Decree did not bar Elaine Jenkins' claim under
the doctrine of "issue preclusion." The issue as to ownership of the Redwood Road House
in the divorce proceeding was not identical to the issue as to ownership of the Redwood
Road House in this case. The issue as to ownership of the Redwood Road House in this case
was also not "competently, fully and fairly litigated" in the divorce proceeding.
Alan Jenkins' Motion to File Amended Answer was also properly denied. Alan
Jenkins failed to transcribe the trial court's ruling on that motion, and for that reason alone
the Alan Jenkins' appeal on that issue should be denied.
Finally, the trial court properly refused to give the eight Jury instructions proposed
by Alan Jenkins. Alan Jenkins failed to adequately brief the issue. The Jury instructions

12

proposed were inapplicable and misstated the law. There was also no reasonable likelihood
that the outcome would have been different if the requested Jury instructions had been
given.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Alan Jenkins claims the trial court errored in denying his Motion for Summary
Judgment. However, where a motion for summary judgment is denied, and then there is a
trial, the appellate court will not consider whether the trial court errored in denying the
motion for summary judgment. Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment Inc., 174 P3d 1 (Utah
App. 2007) (a denial of a motion for summaryjudgment is not appealable because "[a]t trial,
[the moving party] had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues raised in the summary
judgment motion." Id at ^f 13 [citation omitted.]) In this case, Alan Jenkins may not appeal
the trial court's denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment since there was subsequently
a trial and Alan Jenkins had the opportunity to raise at trial the same issues raised in his
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Even if the trial court's denial of Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment was
appealable (which it was not), the trial court did not error in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion
for Summary Judgment. In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Alan Jenkins argued that
Elaine Jenkins' quiet title action was barred by the statute of frauds and by the doctrine of
"issue preclusion." Neither of those claims are correct.
13

A. Plaintiffs Claims Were Not Barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court errored in failing to grant his Motion for
Summary Judgment on grounds that Elaine Jenkins5 claim that D.U. Company held title to
the Property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins was barred by the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds states that "no estate or interest in property... shall be created, granted,
assigned, [or] surrendered [except] in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same." Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-1.
Alan Jenkins acknowledges that once a conveyance has been fully or partially
completed, that transaction no longer falls within the statute of frauds. See Appellant's
Brief, pg. 11 (arguing that "before that exception applies, there must be a showing of an
agreement or contract to be performed."). See also, Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah
1998,) (holding that the statute of frauds does not apply to a verbal agreement to transfer an
interest in real property where there has been an (1) agreement, (2) part or full performance,
and (3) reliance thereon.)
However, Alan Jenkins argues that it is undisputed that there was no oral argument
between D.U. Company and Elaine Jenkins pursuant to which D.U. Company agreed to hold
title to the Property for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins and her husband and, therefore, Elaine
Jenkins' claims were barred by the statute of frauds and the trial court erred in denying his
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 15 ("Plaintiff did not allege or
show that such an agreement or contract existed.") Alan Jenkins' assertion that there was

14

no material issue of fact as to the existence of an oral agreement between D.U. Company and
the Jenkins is without merit. In her affidavit filed in opposition to Alan Jenkins' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Elaine Jenkins alleged that she and Sam Jenkins purchased the
Redwood Road House with $40,000 in equity from the Woods Cross House and 10,000
"units" on deposit with the Davis County Cooperative Society. R. 129. She also averred
that D.U. Company "held the Property for the benefit of myself and Sam Jenkins." R. 129.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, the appeals
court will 'review the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.'" Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 48 P.3d 941, 944 (Utah 2002)
quoting Booth v. Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. Inc.. 20 P.3d 319 (Utah 2000.) Elaine
Jenkins' affidavit clearly disputes Alan Jenkins' claim that there was no oral agreement
made between D.U. Company and Sam and Elaine Jenkins. Therefore, in reviewing the
facts and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to Elaine Jenkins, the trial court
did not err in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment because there was
clearly a material issue of fact as to whether an oral agreement existed between Sam and
Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in
1986..
In this case, the agreement between Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D .U. Company was
fully performed at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased in 1986. At that time,
Sam and Elaine Jenkins transferred $40,000 in equity from the Woods Cross Property and
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10,000 "units" from their account with the Davis County Cooperative Society to pay the
$50,000 purchase price for the Redwood Road Property. The monthly statements introduced
by Elaine Jenkins at trial demonstrated that 40,000 units were deducted from the Jenkins'
account at the time the Woods Cross House was purchased, and 10,000 units were deducted
from the Jenkins5 account at the time the Redwood Road House was purchased. The annual
inventory lists maintained by Davis County Cooperative showed the Woods Cross House
as "property" owned by Sam and Elaine Jenkins and later showed the Redwood Road House
as "property" owned by Sam and Elaine Jenkins. Documents introduced at trial also
demonstrated that Sam and Elaine Jenkins' account with the Davis County Cooperative
Society was debited annually to pay for property taxes on the Property.9
The statute of frauds does not "undo" a transaction completed many years earlier
simply because the transaction was not "subscribed" in writing at the time of the

9

A11 of the three requirements in Orton v. Carter were satisfied. There was an
"agreement" - D.U. Company agreed to acquire and hold "legal title" to the Redwood
Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins. There was "full or partial
performance" of that agreement - the Jenkins "traded in" the Wood's Cross House (for a
$40,000 equity trade) and had 10,000 in "units" deducted from their account to pay the
purchase price of the Redwood Road House and D.U. Company acquired "legal title" to
the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins. Finally, there was "reliance."
The Jenkins paid the purchase price for the Redwood Road House. The Jenkins moved
out of the Woods Cross House and into the Redwood Road House. 10,000 "units" were
deducted from Sam and Elaine Jenkins' account to pay the balance of the purchase price
for the Redwood Road House. The Jenkins paid the property taxes for the Redwood
Road House (which were deducted from their account with the Davis County
Cooperative Society.) The Jenkins lived in the Redwood Road House and maintained it
and improved it and treated it as their own.
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conveyance. In this case, the conveyance of the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company
for the benefit of the Jenkins occurred in 1986. The dispute arose 19 years after that
conveyance, when D.U. Company "sold" the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins.
Alan Jenkins' reliance on Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953) is misplaced.
That case involved an action for specific performance of a contract to sell land that
defendant had promised to sign under certain conditions, but had not signed. Elaine Jenkins
was not seeking specific performance of an oral agreement. Elaine Jenkins was seeking to
quiet title to her beneficial interest in a conveyance that occurred 19 years earlier.
In his brief, Alan Jenkins concedes that the full or partial performance exception to
the statute of frauds applies in this case once Elaine Jenkins has alleged an oral agreement
between her and D.U. Company. Alan Jenkins' claim that Elaine Jenkins failed to allege
such an oral argument is without merit.
B. Plaintiffs Claims Are Not Barred by the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion.
Alan Jenkins next claims that the statement in the 1997 Divorce Decree that Sam and
Elaine Jenkins "owned no other real property" bars Elaine Jenkins, under the doctrine of
issue preclusion, from now claiming an interest in the Redwood Road House. Two elements
of the doctrine of issue preclusion are not satisfied in this case. Issue preclusion requires
that "the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at hand"
and that the issue "have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in a previous action."
See Macris & Associates. Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1222 (Utah 2000.) In this
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case, neither of those elements were satisfied.
(i) No "identity of issues." The issue in this case involves whether D.U.
Company held title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins.
That issue was not before the Court in the Jenkins5 divorce action. The issue in the Jenkins'
divorce action was how the marital assets were to be divided between Sam and Elaine
Jenkins. The Divorce Decree was entered based on a stipulation that "the parties acquired
no other real property during the course of the marriage" and therefore no further property
division between Sam and Elaine Jenkins was required. The issue as to whether D. U.
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of Sam and Elaine
Jenkins was not "identical" to the issue in the divorce action.
To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result that, where parties to a divorce
proceeding fail to list all of the real property that they own in a divorce decree, the parties
are thereafter "barred" from claiming ownership in that property. In other words, where
parties to a divorce action fail to list all the property they own in a divorce decree, their
ownership interest "disappears."
This would also lead to the absurd result that a third-party (in this case D.U.
Company) would suddenly receive a windfall - title to property that it never owned and
never paid for. Should Alan Jenkins' suggested application of this rule be followed, D.U.
Company would now own both legal and equitable title to property that it did not pay for
and did not own, and would be able to sell that property and keep the sales proceeds simply
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because the true owners had failed to list all the property they owned in a divorce
proceeding.10
(ii) Not competently, fully and fairly litigated. The issue as to whether D.U.
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins was also
not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated" in the divorce action. The Divorce Decree was
entered by stipulation, not judicial adjudication. "An issue determined by stipulation rather
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an
intention to that effect." Id. at 1223. (Emphasis added.) See also 18 Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedures § 4443, at 382
(1981) ("Issue preclusion does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended
that the issue be foreclosed in other litigation." (Emphasis added.))
The required intent by Elaine Jenkins was never demonstrated in this case. Before
signing the stipulation, Elaine Jenkins specifically asked her attorney whether signing the
stipulation would adversely affect her ability to make a claim to her ownership interest in
the Redwood Road House. Elaine Jenkins signed the stipulation based on the understanding
that signing the stipulation would not adversely affect her ability to establish ownership of
the Redwood Road House in the future, should the need arise. Elaine Jenkins testified that
had she understood that her signing of the stipulation would have had that effect (i.e., barred
10

In this case, having lost his ownership in the Redwood Road House, Alan Jenkins has
the right to recover from D.U. Company the purchase price he paid to D.U. Company. D.U.
Company did not have the right to sell Alan Jenkins the Redwood Road House, and was unjustly
enriched by receiving proceeds from the sale of property that it did not own.
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her right to claim her ownership interest in the future), she would have never signed the
stipulation. Accordingly, the issue as to whether D.U. Company held legal title to the
Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins was never "completely, fully, and fairly
litigated" in the Jenkins5 divorce action.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION
TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE.
On June 2, 2006, Alan Jenkins filed a Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant,
seeking to amend his Answer to add for the first time the affirmative defense of the four-year
statute of limitations set forth in Section 78-12-25(3) of the Utah Code. Alan Jenkins claims
that the trial court "abused its discretion" in denying that motion, and claims that the reason
for the court denying defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend is "not apparent from the
record." Appellant's Brief, pg 18. However, Alan Jenkins failed to transcribe the Court's
ruling from the bench at the hearing at which Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of
Defendant was denied. Alan Jenkins is required to obtain a "transcript of all evidence
relevant" to the appeal the trial court's denial of that motion and "[n] either the court nor the
appellees is obligated to correct appellants deficiencies in providing the relevant portion of
the transcript:"
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusions unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in
providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(c)(2).
Alan Jenkins was required to "include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant" to
the Court's denial of his Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant, and failed to do so.
Accordingly, Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be denied on this basis alone.
Elaine Jenkins has obtained a transcript of the trial court's ruling on August 14,2006
on Alan Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant. The trial court denied Alan
Jenkins' Motion to Amend Answer of Defendant on the grounds that it was untimely, that
a late amendment would prejudice plaintiff and that Alan Jenkins had given no "good
reason" for the delay:
[w]e have a trial set. It is coming right up; 60 days is not a very
long amount of time before the trial is set. Actually this was we doubled to set this first as a first-place setting and then as a
second-place setting.
We've passed the second-place setting on - with my
determination that not enough time had been - first place had
gone to - or to second place had gone to first place; and I didn't
feel it was enough time, given the fact that this is a Jury trial,
with the lists and so forth of witnesses; and- that have been
designated as witnesses.
So this is really a continue, if you will, or a second - a second
setting for this case; and we're coming right up onto it. So I
don't' know there's much question here that your request is not
timely, given that; and your argument, Mr. Kingston, that I had
permitted the plaintiff to amend, I'm not giving that much
weight for this reason. We - 1 did that in August of last year, a
year ago and more. Actually a year and coup - and a week. I
think it was August the 5th with the second request to amend.
So it's been a year since we did that.
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All these time periods have passed, including the submission of
witness lists and so forth. The matter's in place. So it seems to
me that this is untimely. Although I appreciate, Mr. Kingston,
your representation that this really is not going to require a great
deal of discovery and so forth, if any, I don't know that I can
come to that same conclusion.
Apparently you have become aware of this as a result of
information that has come to your attention. Seems to me that
we're really hard pressed to tell Mr. Cline that "You better be
prepared for this affirmative defense," without conducting
much - without opening that up. Of course, if I open up
discovery, then I've got to open it up, and all the rest of it.
So it seems to me that because this motion is not timely, and
because I really don't have a good reason why this motion is
untimely, given the fact that we did have a discovery period and
so forth, that your motion is respectfully denied.
Transcript of August 14, 2006 hearing, pp 13-15.11
The trial court found that the motion was not timely — "I don't know there's much question
here that your request is not timely." Id. The trial court found that Alan Jenkins had not
given any reason for the untimely motion - "I really don't have a good reason why this
motion is untimely." Id. The trial court also found that plaintiff would be prejudiced if the
motion was granted - "It seems to me that we're really hard pressed to tell Mr. Cline that
"you better be prepared for this affirmative defense, without conducting much - without
opening [up discovery.]" Id Accordingly, the trial court gave three reasons for denying
defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend, none of which were addressed by Alan Jenkins in
1

Elaine Jenkins filed a Motion to Supplement the Record to include this transcript as part
of the record. As of the date this brief was filed there had been no ruling on that motion. The
transcript has been included with the rest of the record.
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his brief. For this reason as well, Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be denied.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING
ALAN JENKINS JURY INSTRUCTION.
Alan Jenkins offered eight Jury instructions which were rejected by the trial court.
Four instructions related to the statute of frauds, two related to issue preclusion, one related
to the four year statute of limitations and one related to a cause of action for adverse
possession.
A. Standard of Review.
An appellate court may reverse and remand on the basis of a challenge to Jury
instructions only if it finds that the refusal to give the requested Jury instructions was
reversible error and that error caused prejudice to the complaining party. State v. Stringham,
17 P.3d 1153, 1157 (Utah App. 2001), see also State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d988, 990 (Utah
App. 1993) and Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995).
Reversible error may be found only if the omission of the requested Jury instructions
tended to mislead the Jury, or insufficiently or erroneously advised the Jury on the law.
Stringham, at 1157. Prejudice to the complaining party may be found only if there is a
"reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable
to the complaining party." Tingev v. Christensen. 987 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999), see also
Cox v. State, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah App. 1988.)
The Court of Appeals has held that reversible error may not be found if the reviewing
court finds one of the following. First, reversible error may not be found if the instructions,
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read as a whole, fairly instructed the Jury on the applicable law. Normandeau v. Hanson
Equip., Inc., 174 P.3d 1,10-11 (Utah App. 2007). Second, if the requested instructions were
properly covered in the other approved instructions. Id And, third, if the requested
instructions did not accurately state the applicable law. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799
(Utah 1991.)
B. Failure to Adequately Brief.
Alan Jenkins has devoted almost no discussion as to why the trial court errored in
refusing to give the eight requested Jury instructions. The entire discussion is 3 Vi pages.
No statutes or case law is cited. None of the eight Jury instructions are set forth in whole
or in part in the text. Appellant has the burden of providing a sufficient legal basis for
granting his appeal. Alan Jenkins has inadequately briefed this issue for the Court by failing
to provide any legal analysis or authority to support his claim of reversible error and
prejudice. According to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, briefs must
contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure places the burden upon the appellant to properly brief the issues for
review. See Utah R. App. P. 24. "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court.'" Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, f 8, 995 P.2d 14 (citation omitted.)
The appellate court may decline to address an issue on this ground alone. Bearden vs.
Wardlev Corporation, 72 P.3d 144, ftnt 4 (Utah 2003.) Appellant's brief on this issue is
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clearly inadequate because it fails to cite a single legal authority and the arguments, based
solely on factual recitations, are completely devoid of any legal analysis. Appellee should
not be placed in the position of having to draft a responsive brief when the reasons for
appellant requesting reversal are unclear.
Under Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "briefs that are not in
compliance with Rule 24 may be disregarded or stricken sua sponte by the Court." Id.
Thus, this Court may properly disregard this issue because it has been inadequately briefed
and affirm the trial court's refusal to give the requested instructions. See State v. Herrera.
895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995). Alan Jenkins' appeal on this issue should be dismissed on
this grounds alone.
In the event the Court finds that Appellant has adequately briefed this issue, the trial
court did not error in denying Alan Jenkins' proposed Jury instructions.
C. Refusal to Give the Requested Instructions was not Reversible Error.
1.

Four Statute of Frauds instructions. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court

errored in refusing to submit the following four Jury instructions, all of which relate to the
statute of frauds:
A person claiming an interest in real property, must be able to
evidence that interest by a deed or conveyance in writing,
signed by the entity or person from whom that person claims to
have acquired the interest. If there is no such deed or
conveyance in writing, under the law, the person has no
enforceable interest in the property.
R. 298.
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"Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. An
agreement for the sale of land is void and unenforceable unless
the agreement or some note or memorandum of the agreement
is in writing, signed by the party selling the land.
R. 300.
There is an exception to the law that a person claiming an
interest in real property must be able to evidence that interest by
a deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or person
from whom that person claims to have acquired the interest. To
qualify for the exception, Elaine Jenkins must prove by clear
and positive proof that there was an agreement between her and
the property owner that the property would be transferred to her
if she performed certain conditions, the agreed condition must
be established with certainty and you must find that she did in
fact perform those conditions pursuant to the agreement.
R.299.
In order to find that Elaine Jenkins performed or partially
performed an agreement whereby she would obtain title to the
real property in question, even though there is no written
document evidencing such an agreement, you must find that the
owner of the property agreed that upon the performance of
certain actions, the property would be transferred to her; that
there was a meeting of the minds between the owner of the
property and Elaine Jenkins as to what those certain actions
were that she was to perform and that she did in fact perform
those actions.
R. 304.
(i) Inapplicable. The foregoing instructions, as drafted, are inapplicable since,
as a matter of law, the statute of frauds does not apply to a transaction that has already
occurred. It is undisputed that Elaine Jenkins property interest in the Redwood Road House,
was created, if at all, in 1986.
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Furthermore, the instructions incorrectly assume that the conveyance of the Redwood
Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of the Jenkins has not yet taken place and that
D.U. Company was the "property owner." Alan Jenkins claims that Elaine Jenkins must
prove "that there was an agreement between her and the property owner that the Property
would be transferred to her if she performed certain conditions." R. 299, 304 (Emphasis
added.) In this case, the previous "property owner" was Gordon Berg, and he transferred
the Redwood Road House to D.U. Company for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins in
1986. D.U. Company was never the "property owner" since it never received more than
bare legal title, with the beneficial (or ownership) interest belonging to the Jenkins. Elaine
Jenkins sought to quiet title to a property interest conveyed to her in 1986, not in some future
conveyance. "[T]he trial court may properly refuse to give the requested instructions where
it does not accurately reflect the law governing the factual situation of the case." Black vs.
McKnight 562 P.2d 621, 621 (Utah 1977.)
(ii) Misstates the law. Those Jury instructions misstate the law as to the statute
of frauds. If there was an "agreement," "part or full performance" and "reliance" thereon,
the statute of frauds no longer applies. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998). This
exception is not stated in Alan Jenkins' proposed instructions.
(iii) Unnecessary. The foregoing exception to the statute of frauds was
necessarily satisfied if the Jury answered Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively. In answering
Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively, the Jury found that, in 1986, at the time the Redwood
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Road House was transferred to D.U. Company, "Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company
intended that D.U. Company hold legal title to that property for the benefit of Sam and
Elaine Jenkins." Once the Jury answered Jury Instruction No. 1 affirmatively, the Jury also
necessarily found that the full or partial performance exception to the statute of frauds
applied in this case.
(iv) Covered in other instructions. The trial court did not commit reversible
error when it refused to give these proposed instructions to the Jury because the legal correct
part of these instructions (i.e., the part that did not misstate the law) was properly covered
in the other approved instructions. As discussed above, there is no reversible error if the
trial court rejects requested instructions that were fully covered in the other instructions
given. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Utah App. 2007.) The
legally correct portions of these requested instructions focus exclusively on the Jury's
determination of whether an agreement was made between appellee and D.U. Company.
Though with fewer words, approved Jury instruction number 14 covered the same
applicable instructions and law contained in those instructions. Instruction number 14
stated, "You must decide whether there was an agreement between Sam and Elaine Jenkins
and D.U. Company pursuant to which D.U. Company was holding legal title to the property
at 1074 Redwood Road for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins." It has been held that a
party is not entitled "to have the Jury instructed with any particular wording." RL at 11.
Therefore, because Jury instruction number 14 properly covered, though not in appellant's
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particular wording, the applicable instructions and law contained in those instructions, the
trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to give them.
(v) No prejudice. Even if the trial court's refusal to give Alan Jenkins
requested Jury instructions was error (which it was not), Alan Jenkins has the burden of
further demonstrating that failure to give the requested instructions was reversible error. In
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc.. 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999), the Court held that refusal
to give a Jury instruction is reversible error only if "there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable to the complaining party:"
We have previously stated the circumstances in which a refusal
to give a Jury instruction is reversible error:
We may reverse a trial court judgment only if there is a
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have
been a result more favorable to the complaining party. The
failure to give an instruction to which a party is entitled may
constitute reversible error only if it tends to mislead the Jury to
the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or
erroneously advises the Jury on the law.
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc.. 992 P.2d 969 (Utah 1999). Id at 974 [citations
omitted.]
Alan Jenkins has not argued how the omission of these requested instructions
prejudiced the outcome of the trial in favor of appellee. "Even if we find an error, however,
we will reverse only if defendant [appellant] shows reasonable probability the error affected
the outcome of his case." State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d 988,990 (Utah App. 1993). Appellant
has failed to do this. Even if he had attempted such an argument in his brief, it would have
29

been unpersuasive. The outcome of the trial depended on that Jury's finding of whether an
agreement was made between Sam and Elaine Jenkins and D.U. Company pursuant to which
D.U. Company would hold legal title to the Property for their benefit. Given that the Jury
did find that an agreement was made, the threshold question then becomes, would the Jury
have found differently if these instructions had been given to them? The answer is no
because the finding of an agreement necessarily exempts the transaction from the application
of the statute of frauds. Therefore, appellant has failed to show, or to even argue that there
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result more
favorable to him. The trial court's refusal to give these instructions did not cause prejudice
to appellant.
2.

Two Estoppel Jury Instruction. Alan Jenkins claims that two "estoppel"

instructions should have been given to the Jury:
When a person, by her acts or conducts, voluntarily causes
another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things,
and thereby induces him to act on that belief so as to change his
previous condition, the person inducing such belief will be
estopped from afterwards denying the existence of such state of
things, to the prejudice of the person so action.
R.303.
A party cannot adopt a position in a subsequent lawsuit contrary
to a position ruled upon by the court in a previous lawsuit. If
you find that in Elaine Jenkins' previous divorce action, she
took the position that she did not own the property in question
and that the court ruled in a final judgment that she did not own
the property, then you must find against her on the claim she
now makes in this lawsuit that she does own the property.
30

R. 305.
(i) Inapplicable. The first Jury instruction (R. 303) is inapplicable since Alan
Jenkins was not a party to the divorce action and therefore nothing Elaine Jenkins signed in
the divorce action would have "induce[d] Alan Jenkins to [rely thereon] so as to change his"
position.
As to the second Jury instruction (R. 305), for the doctrine of "issue preclusion" to
apply, the issue in the previous action must be identical to the issue in the present action and
most have been "completely, fully and fairly litigated" in the previous action. See Macris
& Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 121, 1222 (Utah 2000.) The second Jury
instruction is inapplicable since, as a matter of law, the issue in the divorce action was not
identical to the issue in this action. Furthermore, because the Divorce Decree was based on
a stipulation, the issue of whether legal title to the Redwood Road House was held by D.U.
Company for the benefit of the Jenkins was not, as a matter of law, "completely, fully and
fairly litigationed" in the divorce action. These issues were previously discussed on pages
17-20.
(ii) Misstates the law. For issue preclusion to apply, the issue in the prior case
and in the present case must be "identical" and the issue must have been "fully, fairly and
completely" litigated in the prior action. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16
P.3d 121, 1222 (Utah 2000.) Neither of these requirements are included in Alan Jenkins5
proposed Jury instructions.
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(iii) No prejudice. Finally, Alan Jenkins fully argued this issue at trial, in its
proper context, as evidence that the Jenkins and D.U. Company did not intend that D.U.
Company acquire and hold title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of the Jenkins:
I want you to take a closer look at P-9 [the Divorce Decree],
which is the stipulation for divorce. You'll see that everything
that does normally occur at any divorce action would be
acquitted in that stipulation. All the property is divided, the
assets are divided, the provisions made for the recitation of the
children and so on.
Again, do you really believe that a divorce attorney would give
advice to his client, "Look, don't worry about that. You don't
have to show that. You don't have to list that. You don't have
to declare it." Of course, if she talks about missing witnesses.
Do you think that she could get that attorney to come in here
and acknowledge that she gave that kind of information or
advice?
R. 386, pp. 521-22.
As far as the divorce attorney saying, "Well, let's not worry
about them now; let's take it up later," a divorce would be the
time to take care of all the issues on property ownership. That's
where you do it. That's why you have the divorce; so you can
decide who owns what, who has to pay what bills, who has
rights to the children and so on. It's not something an attorney
would say, "We don't have to deal with that now; we'll just deal
with it later. We're just going to tell the Court right now, we
don't own any property."
R. 386, p. 533.
Alan Jenkins argued that Elaine Jenkins' testimony regarding statements by her divorce
attorney were unbelievable - "[D]o you really believe that a divorce attorney would give
advise to his clients...you don't have to list [the Redwood Road House]." Id at 522. "It's
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not something an attorney would say, 'We don't have to deal with that now, we'll just deal
with it later. We're just going to tell the Court right now, we don't own any property.'" IdL
at 533. Alan Jenkins argued to the Jury that Sam and Elaine Jenkins' failure to include the
Redwood Road House as a marital asset in the Divorce Decree was evidence that the Jenkins
did not own any interest in the Redwood Road Property. Alan Jenkins made his argument
to the Jury, and the Jury found to the contrary. Accordingly, Alan Jenkins has failed to
demonstrate that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the Jury would have reached a
more favorable result if the proposed instruction had been given. See Robinson vs. All-Star
Delivery. Inc.. 992 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 1999.)
3.

Statute of Limitations Instructions. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court

errored in failing to give the following Jury instruction on the four-year statute of limitations
to the Jury:
There is a four year statute of limitations that governs the
recovery of real property held by a person other than the owner
of the property. This means that in order to recover property
held in trust by another entity, the true owner must file suit to
recover the property within four years from the time she
discovers that the property was not in her name. Elaine Jenkins
claims that although Alan Jenkins holds legal title to the
property. If you find that Elaine Jenkins did pay for the subject
property, in order to prevail on this claim, Elaine Jenkins must
show that she did not learn that the property was in someone's
name other than hers and Sam's until a date less than four years
from the date she filed the Complaint in this case. If you find
that Elaine Jenkins knew that the title to the property in question
was held in someone's name other than hers or Sam's more than
four years before she filed the lawsuit in this case, you must
find in favor of Alan Jenkins.
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R. 301.
(i) Inapplicable. The four year statute of limitations is found in Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-12-25(3). Alan Jenkins did not raise that statute of limitations in his
Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. See R. 166-172. The four year statute of
limitations is inapplicable because it was not raised as an affirmative defense. If an
affirmative defense is not raised, it is waived. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
("A party waives all defenses and objections not presented by motion or by answer or
reply."); Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558 (UT 2000) (statute of limitations that was not raised
in Answer was waived); Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 2 P.2d 107 (Utah 1931) (statute of
limitations that was not raised in Answer was waived.) In June, 2006, Alan Jenkins tried to
amend his Answer to include this statute of limitations as a defense, but that motion was
denied. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying that motion has been
previously discussed.
(ii) Misstates the law. Even if that instruction was applicable (which it is not),
that instruction ailso misstates the law. The instruction states that "Elaine Jenkins must show
that she did not learn that the [Redwood Road House] was in someone else's name other
than hers until a date less than four years from the date she filed the Complaint." That is not
correct. Elaine Jenkins has known that the Redwood Road House was not in her name since
the date it was purchased in 1986. Since 1986, Elaine Jenkins has believed that D.U.
Company held legal title to the Redwood Road House for the benefit of herself (and Sam.)
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Because D.U. Company held legal title for the benefit of the Jenkins, it was not until D.U.
Company sold the Redwood Road House to Alan Jenkins in 2005 that Elaine Jenkins' claim
arose. Elaine Jenkins immediately filed a Complaint.
(iii) No prejudice. As previously discussed, Alan Jenkins has failed to provide
any discussion as to a "reasonable likelihood" that giving the requested instruction would
have resulted in a "more favorable verdict." Even if the requested instruction had been
given, the verdict would have been the same.
4. Adverse possession instruction. Alan Jenkins claims that the trial court errored
in failing to give the following Jury instruction to the Jury:
The occupation of real property by someone other than the
person who established legal title to the property is deemed to
be under and by the authority of the person establishing legal
title, unless the person occupying the property can show that she
has occupied the property for at least seven years and that
during that seven year period, she has paid all of the taxes
levied and assessed against the property. Unless you find that
Elaine Jenkins has paid all of the real property taxes assessed
against the property for seven consecutive years, and that such
payment was not paid to the property owner as partial rent or
consideration for the right to use of the property under a rental
agreement, you must find in favor of Alan Jenkins.
R. 302.
(i) Inapplicable. This instruction is based on Utah Code Sections 78-12-7 and
78-12-12. See citation at the bottom of R. 302. Those statutes relate to the "recovery" of
real property in an adverse possession action, during which the claimant has paid property
taxes for seven years. This is not a "recovery" action since Elaine Jenkins is not trying to
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"recovery" title from D.U. Company. Elaine Jenkins is trying to "quiet title" as to what
already exists - that D.U. Company has held legal title for Jenkins since the property was
acquired in 1986. This instruction was inapplicable since Elaine Jenkins did not file a claim
for adverse possession. No claim for adverse possession was heard by the Jury.
(ii) Misstates the law. Alan Jenkins claims that "occupation of real property
by someone other than" the record title holder is deemed to be "under the authority o f the
legal title holder unless that person has paid taxes for seven years. That is not the law.
Elaine Jenkins theory of recovery was that the Redwood Road House was held by D.U.
Company for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins. See, e.g.. Park vs. Zions First National Bank,
673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983.) Alan Jenkins has not challenged that theory of recovery. The
fact that D.U. Company held legal title does not mean that the Jenkins occupied the
Redwood Road House "under the authority" of D.U. Company, since D.U. Company held
legal title for the benefit of the Jenkins.
That instruction also states that "unless you find that Elaine Jenkins paid all of the
real property taxes assessed against the property for seven years. . . you must find in favor
of Alan Jenkins." Again, that is not the law. While Sam and Elaine Jenkins did pay
property taxes through debits from their account with Davis County Cooperative Society,
Elaine Jenkins did not proceed under an "adverse possession" theory. Where D.U. Company
held title to the property for the benefit of Sam and Elaine Jenkins, a finding that "Elaine
Jenkins paid all of the real property taxes assessed against the property for seven years" was
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not necessary to find in favor of Elaine Jenkins.
(iii) No prejudice. As previously discussed, Alan Jenkins has failed to provide
any discussion as to a "reasonable likelihood" that giving the requested instruction would
have resulted in "more favorable verdict." Even if the requested instruction had been given,
the verdict would have been the same.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Alan Jenkins appeal should be denied and Elaine Jenkins
should be awarded her costs for defending this matter on appeal.
DATED this 3

day of July, 2008.

RUSSELL A. CLINE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the , 3
the foregoing to:
Carl E. Kingston
3212 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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day of July, 2008,1 mailed two copies of

ADDENDUM A

cb
SAM & SLAIN3 JENKINS PROPERTY
UNITS USING JAN.1,1954
STEWARDSHIP
PERSONAL
3-usiness Clotning for Resale
House
Green House
19/1 Van
1965 Van
Bee Supplies

UNITS USING JAN.1,1985
STEWARDSHIP
PERSONAL

2459 .50

2000.00
40000.00
150.00

40000.00
100.00

50.00
200.00

25.00

400 .00
550.00
75.00

V¥
1973 Olds
1973 Suburban
?973Buick Sta. Wagon
PSRSONAL PROPERTY
Fridge
Fruit Trees
Furniture
Toys for Resale
Hoped
Bosch

1500.00
200.00

3484.50
2300.00
1184.50
$37.00

STEWARDSHIP DECREASE
TOTAL PR0P3RTY DECREASE.

2218.00
200.00
150.00
80.00
100.00
150.00
270.00
43568.00

2200.00
80.00
100.00

2300.00

PERSONAL INCREASE.

547.50

TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE
547-50
PL
4.800.30
DEBTS FROM 1984 STATEMENTS
2,05°.49
BALANCE INCREASE LESS DEBTS
2,193-01
PLACED IN RESERVE
219-30
BALANCE INCREASE LESS RESERVE
1,973-71
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1984
__43.78Q.53
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN 1, I985
45,763.24
STEWARDSHIP UNITS USING 1985 2^00.00
''
PERSONAL. UNITS USING i/l/85 44205.00
TOTAL, UNITS USING JAN 1, 1985
46,505.00
TOTAL UNITS PAYING SERV CHG ON FOR 1985
74l.?6

<2>

J

Q)

#

3,262.97 less 4,800.00 plus 2,059-49 plus 219.30
equals 741.76
DAT1

s

SIGNATURE
DATE

I, or we, the undersigned hereby declare that this inventory
and balance sheet as stated, is true and accurate that I will pay
the balance due ( sr.cwing as unts paying service charge on) on derand
oJ-UNidj _Ii J.J-1L /-hi^iENwr, O r :

SIC-NATTJRE

100.00
200.00
44205.00
43568.00
637.00

SAM & 3LSIN3 JENKINS PROPERTY

cb

UNITS USING JAN.1,1985
UNITS USING JAN.1,1986
STEWARDSHIP
PERSONAL
STEWARDSHIP
PERSONAL
Business*Clothing /Resale
2000.00
1000.00
House
40000.00
40000.00
Green House
100.00
100.00
VW
25.00
25.00
1973 Suburban
1500.00
1000.00
1973 Buick Sta. Wagon
200.00
100.00
PERSONAL PROPERTY
2200.00
2200.00
Furniture
80,00
80.00
Toys f o r R e s a l e
100.00
100.00
Moped
100.00
100.00
Bosch
200.00
200.00
2300.00
44205.00
43705.00
1200.00
1200.00
..5400.00
Acc .Payable..
STEWARDSHIP DECREASE
1100.00
38305.00
38305.00
m
5900.00
PERSONAL DECF3A3S,..
1100.00
7000.00
TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE. • • • •
DUE ANNETTE MORGAN FOR TOYS
44.29
NOTE PAYMENTS 1935
$ 4800.00
DEBTS FROM 1985 STATEMENTS
388.77
DECREASE IN PROPERTY
7000.00
D31REA33 PLUS DEBTS LESS NOTE PYMT
$^Z63^Il6^\<
TOTAL UNITS OWNED JAN. 1,1985
."..'/" 45763.24 \
TOTAL UNITS OWMED JAN. 1,1986
( . $ 4J130.18 J
STEWARDSHIP UNITS B3ING JAN.1,1986. .$ 1 2 0 0 . 0 0 - '" •
PERSONAL UNITS JAN. 1,1986
3830«5.00 39505.00 - J
UNITS RECEIVING SERVING 3HASg3 ON FOR 1986 S 3&25.18
$741.?6 p l u s $383.77 minus $4800.00 p l u s 4 4 . 2 9 e q u a l s $3625-18

DATI

SIGNATURE
DATS

I , or we, t h e u n d e r s i g n e d do hereby_
my u n i t s a s shown a b o v e , i n zhe f o l l o w i n g manner

SIGNED

?H3 PRESENCE OF:

SIGNATURE

SAM & ELAINE JENKINS' PROPERTY
UNITS USING JAN.1,1987
STEWARDSHIP
PERSONAL
Business Clothing-Resale
House
Green House
YW
1973 Suburban
1973 Buick Sta Wagon
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Furniture
Toys for Resale
Hoped
Bosch
House Redwood Road
1981 Datsun 210

STEWARDSHIP DECREASE..
TOTAL PROPERTY DECREASE

UNITS USING J AN.1,1988

1000.00
40000.00
100.00
25.00
1000.00

100.00
500.00

100.00
2200.00
80.00

2300.00
80.00

100.00
200.00
50000.00

100.00
50.00
50000.00
1000.00

100.00

.00
54,130.00
1200.00 93,705.00
.00 54.130.00
1200.00 39,575.00 DECREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
1.200.00
.40,775.00
4,800.00
34,150.38
1,200.00
*K),150.38
844.31

PL.
INCREASE FROM 1987 STATEMENTS
DUE FROM WCTS FOR 3 MO INTEREST ON HOUSE
STATEMENT INCREASE PLUS DUE FROM WCTS
DUE TO WCF PROP TAXES 85 THRU MAY 87
BALANCE INCREASE
DECREASE IN PROPERTY
BALANCE DECREASE
UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1987
UNITS OWNED JAN 1, 1988
UNITS USING JAN 1, 1988
UNITS PAYING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR 1988

y

40,775.00

1,468.93
54,440.35

52,971.42
54,130.00

S

1,158.58

v/40,464.65 less 34,150.38 less 1,200.00 plus 844.31 less
' 4,800.00 equals 1,158.58
SIGNATURE

DATE
DATE

I, the undersigned do hereby declare that this inventory and
balance sheet as stated is true and accurate, that I will pay the
balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand.
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

SIGNATURE

^ENWNSrSAM'irELAlNfc Property
JJrdU Using
Stewardship

Units Using

1-Jsn-00
Personal

PERSONAL PROPERTY
Green house
it|3§uburbjn
Mop«i

jJeuffRftdwood Road

19t$^T0y0t«
I960 ChevelH

Payables Sam
Payables Elaine

$.00

$0

VS

S i t w j j rdshlp

$2,400.00
50.00
500.00
80.00
50.00
10.00
50.00
50.000,00
300.00
100.00
400.00
800.00
100.00

$2,400.00
50.00
500.00
80.00
50.00
10.00
50.00
50,000.00
300.00
100.00
400.00
800.00
100.00

(13,770.00)
(21,402.00)

(13,770.00)
(21.402.00)

$19,668.00

$.00
.00
$.00

E / DECREASE IN PROPERTY

_

+

40_
.00
.00
.00
(3,583.66)
.00
(3,583.66)
1,164.80
19 860 43
17.441.57
19.668.00
($2,226.43)

1990

BALANCE DECREASE
TR2
TOTAL UNITS A
1-Jan-90
TOTAL UNI1S&
1-Jan*91
TOTAL UNITS llsiNQ
1 -Jan-91
UNITS PAYING INTEREST ON FOR
$192,43

($3,583.66)

DATE

$19,668.00
19,668.00
$.00
$.00
($3,583.66)

DECFEASEFFDW1990 STATEMENT
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY
INCREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
TOTAL INCREASE IN PROPERTY

BALANCE DECREASE FOR

1-Jan-91
Personal

1991
+

$.00

+

$1,164 80

*

($2,226.43)

SIGNATURE
DATE.

I or we the Undersigned hereby declare that this Inventory and balance sheet as stated is true and accurate,
that I will pay the balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand.

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF*

SIGNATURE:

Page 1

LVK

JENKINS, SAM & ELAINE Property
Units Using
Stewardship

Units Using
Stewardship

1-Jan-94
Personal
$2,500.00
500.00
80.00
10.00
50.00
50,000.00
100.00
500.00
500.00
100.00
50.00
(13,770.00)
(21,402.00)

PERSONAL PROPERTY
1973 Suburban
Furniture
Moped
Bosch
House Redwood Road
1963 Dodge Dart
1976 Dodge Dart
1976 Toyota
1966 Chevelle
1964 Dodge Dart(bad engine)
Payables Sam
Payables Elaine
VW Rabbit
Trailer Van Dyke
Trailer Tammarac H
Dodge Van

$0

$.00

$2,500.00
500.00
80.00
10.00
50.00
50,000.00
100.00
500.00
50.00
100.00
50.00
(13,770.00)
(21,402.00)
200.00
800.00
300.00
1.800.00

$19,218.00

$.00
.00
$.00

INCREASE / DECREASE IN PROPERTY
PL
DECREASE FROM 1994 STATEMENT
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY
INCREASE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
TOTAL INCREASE IN PROPERTY

DATE

$2,650.00

.00
2,650.00

TOTAL UNITS A
1 -Jan-94
TOTAL UNITS A
1-Jan-95
TOTAL UNITS USING
1 -Jan-95
UNITS PAYING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR
($1,050.52)

$21,868.00
19,218.00

$.00
($1,050.52)

2,650.00
.00
.00
1,599.48
(t59.95)
1,439.53
.00
19,428.14
20,867.67
21,868.00
($1,000.33)

BALANCE INCREASE FOR
1994
PR
BALANCE INCREASE LESS PIR FOR

$210.14

1-Jan-95
Personal

1995
+

($159.95)

+

$.00

=

($1,000.33)

SIGNATURE
DATE

I or we the undersigned hereby declare that this inventory and balance sheet as stated is true and accurate,
that I will pay the balance due (showing as units paying service charge on) on demand.

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

SIGNATURE:

Page 1

JENKINS, SAM & ELAINE Property
Units Using
Stewardship

KK
1-Jan-95
Personal

PERSONAL PROPERTY
1973 Suburban
Furniture
Moped
Bosch
House Redwood Road
1963 Dodge Dart
1976 Dodge Dart
1976 Toyota
1966 Chevelle
1964 Dodge Dart(bad engine)
Payables Sam
Payables Elaine
VW Rabbit
Trailer Van Dyke
frailer lammarach
Dodge Van

Units Using
Stewardship

$2,500.00
500.00
80.00
10.00
50.00
50,000.00
100.00
500.00
50.00
100.00
50.00
(13,770.00)
(21,402.00)
200.00
800.00
3C0.CC
1,800.00

$.00

$0

$21,868.00
17,71B.OO
($4,150.00)

INCREASE / DECREASE IN PROPERTY
PL
INCREASEFROM 1995 STATEMENT
INCREASE IN STEWARDSHIP PROPERTY
DECREASE IN PERSONALPROPERTY
TOTAL DECREASE IN PROPERTY
TRTO
LORIN JENKINS
BALANCE DECREASE FOR

$2,500.00
80.00
10.00
50.00
50,000.00
100.00
500.00
50.00
100.00
50.00
(16,770.00)
(21,402.00)
50.00
800.00
1,600.00

$.00
.00
$.00

.00
(4,150.00)
(4,150.00>
(3.24)
,00
(2,966.83)

BALANCE DECREASE

($1,000.33)

$1,186.41

$17,718.00

$.00
$1,186.41

1995

TOTAL UNITS A
1 -Jan-95
TOTAL UNITS A
1 -Jan-96
TOTAL UNnS USING
1 -Jan-96
UNfTS RECEIVING SERVICE CHARGE ON FOR

1-Jan-96
Personal

(2,966.83)
.00
20,867.67
17,900.84
17,718.00
$182.84

1996
($3.24)

+

$.00

$182.84

SIGNATURE

DATE

DATE,
I, the undersigned do hereby __

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

my units as shown above, in the following manner:

SIGNATURE:

Pagel

